The Mitchell Report
(May 4, 2001)
This is the text of the report submitted by the investigatory committee set up to look into the
cause of violence that began in mid-2000. It is named after the chairman of the committee,
former U.S. Senator George Mitchell. The Israelis and Palestinians were given until May 15
to respond to the report.
INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 2000, at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh,
Egypt, the President of the United States spoke on behalf of the participants (the government of
Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the governments of Egypt, Jordan, and the United States, the
United Nations, and the European Union). Among other things, the President stated that:
The United States will develop with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as in consultation with the
United States Secretary General, a committee of fact-finding on the events of the past several
weeks and how to prevent their recurrence...
On November 7, 2000, following consultations with the other participants, the president asked us
to serve on what has come to be known as the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee...
After our first meeting, held before we visited the region, we urged an end to all violence. Our
meetings and our observations during our subsequent visits to the region have intensified our
convictions in this regard. It will only make them worse. Death and destruction will not bring
peace, but will deepen the hatred and harden the resolve on both sides. There is only one way to
bring peace, justice and security in the Middle East, and that is through negotiation.
Despite their long history and close proximity, some Israelis and Palestinians seem not to fully
appreciate each other's concerns. Some Israelis appear not to comprehend the humiliation and
frustration that Palestinians must endure every day as a result of living with the continuing effects
of occupation, sustained by the presence of Israeli military forces and settlements in their midst, or
the determination of the Palestinians to achieve independence and genuine self-determination.
Some Palestinians appear not to comprehend the extent to which terrorism creates fear among
the Israeli people and undermines their belief in the possibility of co-existence, or the
determination of the GOI to do whatever is necessary to protect its people.
Fear, hate, anger, and frustration have risen on both sides. The greatest danger of all that the
culture of peace, nurtured over the past decade is being shattered. In its place there is a growing
sense of futility and despair, and a growing resort to violence.
Two proud people share a land and a destiny. Their competing claims and religious differences
have led to a grinding, demoralizing, dehumanizing conflict. They can continue in conflict or they
can negotiate to find a way to live side-by-side in peace.
So much has been achieved. So much is at risk. If the parties are to succeed in completing their
journey to their common destination, agreed commitments must be implemented, international law
respected, and human rights protected. We encourage them to return to negotiation, however
difficult. It is the only path to peace, justice and security.
DISCUSSION
The violence has not ended (since the Sharm el-Sheikh summit). It has worsened. Thus the
overriding concern of those in the region with whom we spoke is to end the violence and to return
to the process of shaping a sustainable peace.
Their concern must be ours. If our report is to have effect, it must deal with the situation that
exists, which is different from that envisaged by the summit participants. In this report, we will try
to answer the questions assigned to us by the Sharm el-Sheikh summit: What happened? Why did
it happen?
In light of the current situation, however, we must elaborate on the third part of our mandate:
How can the recurrence of violence be prevented? The relevance and impact of our work, in the
end, will be measured by the recommendations we make concerning the following:
· Ending the Violence
· Rebuilding Confidence
· Resuming Negotiations
WHAT HAPPENED?
We are not a tribunal. We complied with the request that we do not determine the guilt or
innocence of individuals or of the parties…
In late September 2000, Israeli, Palestinian, and other officials received reports that Member of
the Knesset (now Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon was planning a visit to the Haram
al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then Prime Minister
Ehud Barak to prohibit the visit. Mr. Barak told us that he believed the visit was intended to be an
internal political act directed against him by a political opponent, and he declined to prohibit it.
Mr. Sharon made the visit on September 28 accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli police officers.
Although Israelis viewed the visit in an internal political context, Palestinians saw it as highly
provocative to them. On the following day, in the same place, a large number of unarmed
Palestinian demonstrators and a large Israeli police contingent confronted each other. According
to the U.S. Department of State, "Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at
police in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal bullets and live
ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 persons and injuring about 200." According
to the GOI, 14 policemen were injured.
Similar demonstrations took place over the following several days. Thus began what has become
known as the "Al-Aqsa Intifada" (Al-Aqsa being a mosque at the Haram al- Sharif/Temple
Mount).
The GOI asserts that the immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of the Camp
David negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the "widespread appreciation in the international
community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse." In this view, Palestinian violence was
planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at "provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties
as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative."
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) denies the allegation that the Intifada was planned.
It claims, however, that "Camp David represented nothing less than an attempt by Israel to
extend the force it exercises on the ground to negotiations."
From the perspective of the PLO, Israel responded to the disturbances with excessive and illegal
use of deadly force against demonstrators; behavior which, in the PLO's view, reflected Israel's
contempt for the lives and safety of Palestinians. For Palestinians, the widely seen images of
Muhammad al Durra in Gaza on September 30, shot as he huddled behind his father, reinforced
that perception.
From the perspective of the GOI, the demonstrations were organized and directed by the
Palestinian leadership to create sympathy for their cause around the world by provoking Israeli
security forces to fire upon demonstrators, especially young people. For Israelis, the lynching of
two military reservists, First Sgt. Vadim Novesche and First Cpl. Yosef Avrahani, in Ramallah on
October 12, reflected a deep-seated Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jews.
What began as a series of confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security
forces, which resulted in the GOI's initial restrictions of the movement of people and goods in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip (closures), has since evolved into a wider array of violent actions and
responses.
In their submissions, the parties traded allegations about the motivation and degree of control
exercised by the other. However, we were provided with no persuasive evidence that the Sharon
visit was anything other than an internal political act; neither were we provided with persuasive
evidence that the PA planned the uprising.
Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA
to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a
delilberate plan by the GOI to respond with lethal force.
However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to
contain the demonstrations and control the violence once it began; or that the GOI made a
consistent effort to use non-lethal means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid
rising anger, fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the other and acted
accordingly.
The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada." But it was poorly timed and the
provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed, it was foreseen by those who urged that
the visit be prohibited. More significant were the events that followed: The decision of the Israeli
police on September 29 to use lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators; and the
subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise restraint.
WHY DID IT HAPPEN?
The roots of the current violence extend much deeper than an inconclusive summit conference.
Both sides have made clear a profound disillusionment with the behavior of the other in failing to
meet the expectations arising from the peace process.
Divergent Expectations: We are struck by the divergent expectations expressed by the parties
in relating to the implementation of the Oslo process. Results achieved from this process were
unthinkable less than 10 years ago. During the latest round of negotiations, the parties were closer
to a permanent settlement than ever before.
Nonetheless, Palestinians and Israeli alike told us that the premise on which the Oslo process is
based – that tackling the hard "permanent status" issues be deferred to the end of the process –
has gradually come under serious pressure.
The GOI has placed primacy on moving toward a Permanent Status Agreement in a nonviolent
atmosphere, consistent with commitments contained in the agreements between the parties.
The PLO view is that delays in the process have been the result of an Israeli attempt to prolong
and solidify the occupation… "In sum, Israel's proposals at Camp David provided for Israel's
annexation of the best Palestinian lands, the perpetuation of Israeli control over East Jerusalem, a
continued military presence on Palestinian territory, Israeli control over Palestinian natural
resources, airspace and borders, and the return of fewer than 1% of refugees to their homes."
Both sides see the lack of full compliance with agreements reached since the opening of the peace
process as evidence of a lack of good faith. This conclusion led to an erosion of trust even before
the permanent status negotiations began.
Divergent Perspectives: During the last seven months, these views have hardened into
divergent realities. Each side views the other as having acted in bad faith; as having turned the
optimism of Oslo into suffering and grief of victims and their loved ones. In their statements and
actions, each side demonstrates a perspective that fails to recognize any truth in the perspective of
the other.
The Palestinian Perspective: For the Palestinian side, "Madrid" and "Oslo" heralded the
prospect of a State, and guaranteed an end to the occupation and a resolution of outstanding
matters within an agreed time. Palestinians are genuinely angry at the continued growth of
settlements and at their daily experiences of humiliation and disruption as a result of Israel's
presence in the Palestinian territories. Palestinians see settlers and settlements in their midst not
only as violating the spirit of the Oslo process, but also as application of force in the form of
Israel's overwhelming military superiority.
The PLO also claims that the GOI has failed to comply with other commitments, such as the
further withdrawal from the West Bank and the release of Palestinian prisoners. In addition,
Palestinians expressed frustration with the impasse over refugees and the deteriorating economic
circumstances in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Israeli Perspective: From the GOI perspective, the expansion of settlement activity and
the taking of measures to facilitate the convenience and safety of settlers do not prejudice the
outcome of permanent status negotiations…
Indeed, Israelis point out that at the Camp David summit and during subsequent talks, the GOI
offered to make significant concessions with respect to the settlements in the context of an overall
agreement.
Security, however, is the key GOI concern. The GOI maintains that the PLO has breached its
solemn commitments by continuing the use of violence in the pursuit of political objectives…
According to the GOI, the Palestinian failure takes on several forms: Institutionalized anti-Israel,
anti-Jewish incitement; the release from detention of terrorists; the failure to control illegal
weapons; and the actual conduct of violent operations… The GOI maintains that the PLO has
significantly violated its renunciation of terrorism and other acts of violence, thereby significantly
eroding trust between the parties.
END THE VIOLENCE
For Israelis and Palestinians alike the experience of the past seven months has been intensely
personal. We were touched by their stories. Israeli and Palestinian families used virtually the
same words to describe their grief.
With widespread violence, both sides have resorted to portrayals of each other in hostile
stereotypes. This cycle cannot be easily broken. Without considerable determination and
readiness to compromise, the rebuilding of trust will be impossible.
Cessation of Violence: Since 1991, the parties have consistently committed themselves, in all
their agreements, to the path of nonviolence. To stop the violence now, the PA and GOI need not
"reinvent the wheel." Rather they should take immediate steps to end the violence, reaffirm their
mutual commitments, and resume negotiations.
Resumption of Security Cooperation: Palestinian security officials told us that it would take
some time for the PA to reassert full control over armed elements nominally under its command
and to exert decisive influence over other armed elements operating in Palestinian area. Israeli
security officials have not disputed these assertions. What is important is that the PA make an
all-out effort to enforce a complete cessation of violence and that it be clearly seen by the GOI as
doing so. The GOI must likewise exercise a 100 percent effort to ensure that potential friction
points, where Palestinians come into contact with armed Israelis, do not become stages for
renewed hostilities.
The collapse of the security cooperation in early October reflected the belief by each party that
the other had committed itself to a violent course of action. If parties wish to attain the standard of
100 percent effort to prevent violence, the immediate resumption of security cooperation is
mandatory.
REBUILD CONFIDENCE
The historic handshake between Chairman Arafat and the late Prime Minister Rabin at the White
House in September 1993 symbolized the expectation of both parties that the door to the
peaceful resolution of differences had been opened. Despite the current violence and mutual loss
of trust, both communities have repeatedly expressed a desire for peace. Channeling this desire
into substantive progress has proved difficult. The restoration of trust is essential, and the parties
should take affirmative steps to this end. Given the high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing
and sequence of these steps are obviously crucial. This can be decided only by the parties. We
urge them to begin the process of decision immediately.
Terrorism: In September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the parties pledged to take
action against "any threat or act of terrorism, violence, or incitement."
Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected noncombatants for
political ends. It seeks to promote a political outcome by spreading terror and demoralization
throughout a population.
In its official submissions and briefings, the GOI has accused the PA of supporting terrorism by
releasing incarcerated terrorists, by allowing PA security personnel to abet, and in some cases to
conduct terrorist operations, and by terminating security cooperation the GOI. The PA vigorously
denies the accusations. But Israelis hold the view that the PA's leadership has made no real effort
to prevent anti-Israeli terrorism. The belief that is, in and of itself, it is a major obstacle to the
rebuilding of confidence.
We believe that the PA has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence by making it clear to both
communities that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and by taking all measures to
prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps
to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
Settlements: The GOI also has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence. A cessation of
Palestinian-Israeli violence will be particularly hard to sustain unless the GOI freezes all settlement
construction activity. Settlement activities must not be allowed to undermine the restoration of
calm and the resumption of negotiations.
On each of our two visits to the region, there were Israeli announcements regarding expansion of
settlements, and it was almost always the first issue raised by Palestinians with whom we met. The
GOI describes its policy as prohibiting new settlements but permitting expansion of existing
settlements to accommodate "natural growth." Palestinians contend that there is no distinction
between "new" and "expanded" settlements; and that, except for a brief freeze during the tenure of
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, there has been a continuing, aggressive effort by Israel to increase
the number and size of settlements.
Reducing Tension: We were told by both Palestinians and Israelis that emotions generated by
the many recent deaths and funerals have fueled additional confrontations, and, in effect,
maintained the cycle of violence. Both sides must make clear that violent demonstrations will not
be tolerated. We can and do urge that both sides exhibit a greater respect for human life when
demonstrators confront security personnel.
Actions and Responses: For the first three months of the current uprising, most incidents did
not involve Palestinian use of firearms and explosives… Altogether, nearly 500 people were
killed and over 10,000 injured over the past seven months; the overwhelming majority in both
categories were Palestinian.
Israel's characterization of the conflict, as "armed conflict short of war," does not adequately
describe the variety of incidents reported since late September 2000. Moreover, by thus defining
the conflict, the IDF has suspended its policy of mandating investigations by the Department of
Military Police Investigations whenever a Palestinian in the territories dies at the hands of an IDF
soldier in an incident not involving terrorism.
Controversy has arisen between the parties over what Israel calls "the targeting of individual
enemy combatants." The PLO describes these actions as "extra-judicial" that is "in clear violation
of Article 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention…." The GOI states that, "whatever action Israel
has taken has been taken firmly within the bounds of the relevant and accepted principles relating
to the conduct of hostilities."
We are deeply concerned about the public safety implications of exchanges of fire between
populated areas. Palestinian gunmen have directed small arms fire at Israeli settlements and at
nearby IDF positions from within or adjacent to civilian dwellings in Palestinian areas, thus
endangering innocent Israeli and Palestinian civilians alike. We condemn the positioning of gunmen
within or near civilian dwellings… We urge that such provocations cease and that the IDF
exercise maximum restraint in its responses if they do occur. Inappropriate or excessive uses of
force often lead to escalation.
On the Palestinian side there are disturbing ambiguities in the basic areas of responsibility and
accountability. We urge the PA to take all necessary steps to establish a clear and unchallenged
chain of command for armed personnel operating under its authority.
Incitement: In their submissions and briefings to the Committee, both sides expressed concerns
about hateful language and images emanating from the other… We call on the parties to renew
their formal commitments to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and to abstain from
incitement and hostile propaganda.
Economic and Social Impact of Violence: Further restrictions on the movement of people and
goods have been imposed by Israel on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These closures take
the three forms: Those which restrict movement between the Palestinian areas and Israel; those
which restrict movement within the Palestinian areas; and those which restrict movement from the
Palestinian areas to foreign countries. These measures have disrupted the lives of hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians.
Of particular concern to the PA has been the destruction by Israeli security forces and settlers of
tens of thousands of olive and fruit trees and other agricultural property. The closures have also
had other adverse effects.
We acknowledge Israel's security concerns. We believe, however, that the GOI should lift
closures, transfer to the PA all revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who have been employed
in Israel to return to their jobs. Closure policies play into the hands of extremists seeking to
expand their constituencies and thereby contribute to escalation. The PA should resume
cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure that Palestinian workers employed within
Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to terrorist organizations.
Holy Places: It is particularly regrettable that the places such as the Temple Mount/Haram
al-Sharif in Jerusalem, Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, and Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem have been the
scenes of violence, death and injury. These are places of peace, prayer and reflection which must
be accessible to all believers. Places deemed holy by Muslims, Jews, and Christians merit
respect, protection and preservation.
International Force: One of the most controversial subjects raised during our inquiry was the
issue of deploying an international force to the Palestinian areas. The PA is strongly in favor of
having such a force to protect Palestinian civilians and their property… The GOI is just as
adamantly opposed to an "international protection force," believing it would prove unresponsive
to Israeli security concerns and interfere with bilateral negotiations to settle the conflict. We
believe that to be effective such a force would need the support of both parties.
RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
Israeli leaders do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding violence." Palestinian leaders do not
wish to be perceived as " rewarding occupation." We appreciate the political constraints on
leaders of both sides. Nevertheless, if the cycle of violence is to be broken and the search for
peace resumed, there needs to be a new bilateral relationship incorporating both security
cooperation and negotiations.
We cannot prescribe to the parties how best to pursue their political objectives. Yet the
construction of a new bilateral relationship solidifying and transcending an agreed cessation of
violence requires intelligent risk-taking. It requires, in the first instance, that each party again be
willing to regard the other as a partner.
To define a starting point is for the parties to decide. Both parties have stated that they remain
committed to their mutual agreements and undertakings. It is time to explore further
implementation. The parties should declare their intention to meet on this basis, in order to resume
full and meaningful negotiations, in the spirit of their undertakings at Sharm el-Sheikh in 1999 and
2000.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The GOI and the PA must act swiftly and decisively to halt the violence. Their immediate
objectives then should be to rebuild confidence and resume negotiations.
END THE VIOLENCE
· The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and undertakings
and should immediately implement an unconditional cessation of violence.
· The GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.
Effective bilateral cooperation aimed at preventing violence will encourage the resumption of
negotiations… We believe that the security cooperation cannot long be sustained if meaningful
negotiations are unreasonably deferred, if security measures "on the ground" are seen as hostile,
or if steps are taken that are perceived as provocative or as prejudicing the outcome of
negotiations.
REBUILD CONFIDENCE
· The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful "cooling off period" and
implement additional confidence building measures.
· The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and discourage incitement in
all its forms.
· The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike that
terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will make a 100 percent effort to
prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps
to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
· The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural growth" of existing
settlements. The kind of security cooperation desired by the GOI cannot for long co-exist with
settlement activity.
* The GOI should give careful consideration to whether settlements which are focal points for
substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips for future negotiations or provocations likely to
preclude the onset of productive talks.
* The GOI may wish to make it clear to the PA that a future peace would pose no threat to the
territorial contiguity of a Palestinian State to be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
· The IDF should consider withdrawing to positions held before September 28, 2000 which will
reduce the number of friction points and the potential for violent confrontations.
· The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouraging
non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to minimizing casualties and friction
between the two communities.
· The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permit Palestinians
who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs; and should ensure that security forces
and settlers refrain from the destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees and other agricultural
property in Palestinian areas.
· The PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the maximum
extent possible, that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of
connections to organizations and individuals engaged in terrorism.
· The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon Israeli
populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on both sides at unnecessary risk.
· The GOI and IDF should adopt and enforce policies and procedures designed to ensure that the
response to any gunfire emanating from Palestinian civilians, bearing in mind that it is probably the
objective of the gunmen to elicit an excessive IDF response.
RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
· We reiterate our belief that a 100 percent effort to stop the violence, an immediate resumption
of security cooperation and an exchange of confidence building measures are all important for the
resumption of negotiations. Yet none of these steps will long be sustained absent a return to
serious negotiations.
It is not within our mandate to prescribe the venue, the basis or the agenda of negotiations.
However, in order to provide an effective political context for practical cooperation between the
parties, negotiations must not be unreasonably deferred and they must, in our view, manifest a
spirit of compromise, reconciliation and partnership, notwithstanding the events of the past seven
months.
George J. Mitchell, Chairman
Former member and Majority Leader of the United States Senate
Suleyman Demirel
9th President of the Republic of Turkey
Thorbjoern Jagland
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway
Warren B. Rudman
Former Member of the United States Senate
Javier Solana
High European Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Union
Source: Ha'aretz, (May 6, 2001)
(http://www.us-israel.org)
The Tenet Cease-Fire Plan
(June 10, 2001)
CIA Director George Tenet traveled to the Middle East in an effort to solidify a cease-fire
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and lay the groundwork for a resumption of
peace talks. The following is the unofficial text (it has not officially been made public) of the
plan:
The security organizations of the Government of Israel (GOI) and of the Palestinian Authority (PA)
reaffirm their commitment to the security agreements forged at Sharm al-Sheikh in October 2000
embedded in the Mitchell Report of April 2001.
The operational premise of the workplan is that the two sides are committed to a mutual,
comprehensive cease-fire, applying to all violent activities, in accordance with the public
declaration of both leaders. In addition, the joint security committee referenced in this workplan
will resolve issues that may arise during the implementation of this workplan.
The security organizations of the GOI and PA agree to initiate the following specific, concrete,
and realistic security steps immediately to reestablish security cooperation and the situation on the
ground as they existed prior to 28 September.
1. The GOI and the PA will immediately resume security cooperation.
* A senior-level meeting of Israeli, Palestinian, and US security officials will be held immediately
and will reconvene at least once a week, with mandatory participation by designated senior
officials.
* Israeli-Palestinian DCOs will be reinvigorated. They will carry out their daily activities, to the
maximum extent possible, according to the standards established prior to 28 September 2000.
As soon as the security situation permits, barriers to effective cooperation – which include the
erection of walls between the Israeli and Palestinian sides – will be eliminated and joint
Israeli-Palestinian patrols will be reinitiated.
* US-supplied video conferencing systems will be provided to senior-level Israeli and Palestinian
officials to facilitate frequent dialogue and security cooperation.
2. Both sides will take immediate measures to enforce strict adherence to the declared cease-fire
and to stabilize the security environment.
* Specific procedures will be developed by the senior-level security committee to ensure the
secure movement of GOI and PA security personnel traveling in areas outside their respective
control, in accordance with existing agreements.
* Israel will not conduct attacks of any kind against the Palestinian Authority Ra'is facilities: the
headquarters of Palestinian security, intelligence, and police organization; or prisons in the West
Bank and Gaza.
* The PA will move immediately to apprehend, question, and incarcerate terrorists in the West
Bank and Gaza and will provide the security committee the names of those arrested as soon as
they are apprehended, as well as a readout of actions taken.
* Israel will release all Palestinians arrested in security sweeps who have no association with
terrorist activities.
* In keeping with its unilateral cease-fire declaration, the PA will stop any Palestinian security
officials from inciting, aiding, abetting, or conducting attacks against Israeli targets, including
settlers.
* In keeping with Israel's unilateral cease-fire declaration, Israeli forces will not conduct
"proactive" security operations in areas under the control of the PA or attack against innocent
civilian targets.
* The GOI will re-institute military police investigations into Palestinian deaths resulting from IDF
actions in the West Bank and Gaza in incidents not involving terrorism.
3. Palestinian and Israeli security officials will use the security committee to provide each other, as
well as designated US officials, terrorist threat information, including information on known or
suspected terrorist operation in – or moving to – areas under the other's control.
* Legitimate terrorist and threat information will be acted upon immediately, with follow-up
actions and results reported to the security committee.
* The PA will undertake preemptive operations against terrorists, terrorist safehouses, arms
depots, and mortar factories. The PA will provide regular progress reports of these actions to the
security committee.
* Israeli authorities will take action against Israeli citizens inciting, carrying out, or planning to
carry out violence against Palestinians, with progress reports on these activities provided to the
security committee.
4. The PA and GOI will move aggressively to prevent individuals and groups from using areas
under their respective control to carry out acts of violence. In addition, both sides will take steps
to ensure that areas under their control will not be used to launch attacks against the other side
nor be used as refuge after attacks are staged.
* The security committee will identify key flash points, and each side will inform the other of the
names of senior security personnel responsible for each flash point.
* Joint Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) will be developed for each flash point. These
SOP's will address how the two sides handle and respond to security incidents; the mechanisms
for emergency contact; and the procedures to deescalate security crises.
* Palestinian and Israeli security officials will identify and agree to the practical measures needed
to enforce "no demonstration zones" and "buffer zones" around flash points to reduce
opportunities for confrontation. Both sides will adopt all necessary measures to prevent riots and
to control demonstration, particularly in flash point areas.
* Palestinian and Israeli security officials will make a concerted effort to locate and confiscate
illegal weapons, including mortars, rockets, and explosives, in areas under their respective control
In addition, intensive efforts will be made to prevent smuggling and illegal production of weapons.
Each side will inform the security committee of the status and success of these efforts.
* The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) will adopt additional non-lethal measures to deal with
Palestinian crowds and demonstrators, and more generally, seek to minimize the danger to lives
and property of Palestinian civilians in responding to violence.
5. The GOI and the PA, through the auspices of the senior-level security committee, will forge –
within one week of the commencement of security committee meetings and resumption of security
cooperation – an agreed-upon schedule to implement the complete redeployment of IDF forces
to positions held before 28 September 2000.
* Demonstrable on-the-ground redeployment will be initiated within the first 48 hours of this
one-week period and will continue while the schedule is being forged.
6. Within one week of the commencement of security committee meetings and resumption of
security cooperation, a specific timeline will be developed for the lifting of interal closures as well
as for the reopening of internal roads, the Allenby Bridge, Gaza Airport, Port of Gaza, and
border crossings. Security checkpoints will be minimized according to legitimate security
requirements and following consultation between the two sides.
* Demonstrable on-the-ground actions on the lifting of the closures will be initiated within the first
48 hours of this one-week period and will continue while the timeline is being developed.
The parties pledge that even if untoward events occur, security cooperation will continue through
the joint security committee.
Source: Ha'aretz, (June 14, 2001)
(http://www.us-israel.org)
Second U.S. "Joint Goals" Proposal
(The "Zinni Paper")
Presented March 26, 2002
1. Phase 1 – Immediate – 48 hours
GOI (Government Of Israel) and PA (Palestinian Authority) leaders
make public declarations of cease-fire to their respective populations.
GOI commits to cease "proactive" operations in areas under the
control of the PA, including attacks on PA Ra'is Facilities; and
headquarters of Palestinian Security, Intelligence, and Police
Organizations; or prisons in the West Bank and Gaza Strip unless
responding in self-defense to an imminent terrorist attack.
PA issues clear orders to field commanders to take action to prevent
terrorism or violent attacks, arrest persons involved in ongoing
terrorist activities, ceases PA security forces involvement in inciting
aiding, abetting attacks against all Israeli targets. PA and GOI issue
clear orders to their field commanders and take other measures
necessary to prevent individuals and groups from using areas under
their respective control to carry out acts of violence.
GOI, acting on information made known to the Trilateral Security
Committee, takes action against Israeli citizens inciting, carrying out,
or planning to carry out violence against Palestinians, with progress
reports to the Security Committee.
GOI and PA resume security cooperation through reinvigoration of
DCOs based on the standards existing before September 28, 20000.
GOI and PA share information on terrorists' threats directly and
through the Trilateral Security Committee followed by immediate
actions and reporting of results to the Security Committee. IDF
adopts measures to reduce lethality of rules of engagement.
GOI and PA allow secure movement of security personnel within Gaza
and WB, in accordance with existing agreements.
PA makes public commitment to prevent smuggling, production,
acquisition of illegal weapons, prepares plan for collecting weapons,
preventing smuggling, and closing factories and arresting those
involved.
IDF carries out demonstrable redeployment (locations to be notified to
the Trilateral Security Committee).
GOI takes demonstrable action to lift closures (locations to be notified
to the Trilateral Security Committee).
PA assumes security responsibility where it has jurisdiction at
locations where GOI eases security restrictions. GOI takes measures
to facilitate the transfer of these responsibilities.
2. 48 Hours – End of Phase 1 – Trilateral Security Committee
Meeting to Assess Progress (Phase 2: 48 Hours – 1 Week)
PA acts decisively to prevent attacks, enforce cease-fire, including
arrest of activists in breach of cease-fire, action against those who
incite, aid and abet such activities.
GOI and PA act to prevent incitement to violence among their
respective populations.
GOI and PA allow secure movement of security personnel within and
between Gaza and WB, in accordance with existing agreements.
GOI completes withdrawal from Area A, continues removal of internal
closures and redeployment according to agreed schedule, including
removal of permanent roadblocks in Gaza, supervised entry of vehicles
at Mawasi area, removal of IDF positions from Palestinian houses,
continues removal of other checkpoints and earth barriers, further
redeployment of armored vehicles.
PA continues to assume security responsibility at locations where GOI
eases security restrictions. GOI continues to take measures to
facilitate the transfer of these responsibilities.
Trilateral committee identifies "flashpoints," each side designates
senior security personnel responsible for them, develops JSOP for
each.
PA presents comprehensive plan for collection of illegal weapons as
defined in existing agreements including the Israel-Palestinian Interim
Agreement, Annex I, articles IV and XI. PA begins actions in concert
with GOI to prevent smuggling of illegal weapons. PA takes
demonstrable action against weapons and mortar factories, based on
PA information and information developed in conjunction with the GOI.
Each side informs the security committee of the status and success
of these efforts.
GOI takes specified actions to ease economic restrictions and
movement of Palestinian civilians, as detailed in Israeli proposal, p. 6.
GOI identifies Palestinian prisoners, including PA security personnel,
arrested in security sweeps and not involved in terrorist activities.
Begins releasing prisoners in this category.
Trilateral Security Committee using information provided by the
parties, identifies activists involved in planning or carrying out terrorist
activities. PA takes demonstrable actions to arrest individuals on this
list.
GOI re-institutes military police investigations into Palestinian deaths
resulting from IDF actions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in
incidents not involving terrorism.
3. 1 Week – End of Phase 2 – Trilateral Security Meeting to
Assess Progress - Phase 3 – 1 Week – 4 Weeks (plus or minus)
(Further Trilateral Security Meetings will be held to assess
interim progress during the course of Phase 3)
Pursuant to agreed schedule, GOI completes redeployment and lifting
of all internal closures to 28 September 2000 positions including
reopening of internal roads, the Allenby bridge, Gaza Airport, Port of
Gaza, and border crossings.
GOI further eases specified civilian restrictions, as detailed in Israeli
proposal, p.7.
PA arrests terrorist activists from names made known to the trilateral
security committee and provides the committee the names of those
arrested, as soon as they are apprehended, as well as summary of
actions taken.
PA takes credible and sustained judicial action ("due process") against
arrested individuals for the purpose of further investigation and
prosecution and punishment of all persons involved in acts of violence
and terror.
PA continues to undertake preemptive operations against terrorism,
continues implementation of illegal weapons collection plan, and
transfer of collected weapons to a third party, continues actions to
prevent smuggling. Measures include taking demonstrable action
against weapons factories, laboratories, safe-houses, and arms
depots at locations identified by the trilateral security committee,
arrests and prosecutes individuals connected with these locations and
other actions against the support structure of terrorism, including the
financing of terrorist activities and mechanisms for inciting terror.
4. 4 Weeks (plus or minus) – End of Phase 3 – Trilateral Security
Committee Meets to Assess Progress and Decide on Transition
to Next Steps
ENDS
(http://www.bitterlemons.org)
See also:
Road Map to Armageddon
Geneva Accord
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